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DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
CASE NOTES
BANKRUPTCY- PREFERENCE - BURDEN OF PROOF IN RECOVERING
TRANSFERS. - In an action by a trustee to defeat a transfer created by
a mortgage the facts showed that Burgess, the bankrupt, being heavily
indebted to the Southern Supply Company, executed to them on July
17, 1924, a mortgage on real estate as security. A petition of invol-
untary bankruptcy was filed against the bankrupt on November 17,
1924, and a final adjudication took place on January 19, 1925. The
trustee attacked this mortgage on the ground that it was an unlawful
and voidable preference as against the bankrupt's creditors. Held,
the trustee failing to show that the bankrupt was insolvent and that
the mortgagee had reasonable cause to believe that a preference would
be effected the mortgage was not voidable as a preference. Manly v.
Southern Supply Company, In Re Burgess, (Md.) 14 F. (2d) 273
(1926).
Before the amendment of June, 19IO to the Bankruptcy Act of
1898, it was necessary in setting aside a transfer as a preference for
the trustee to show that the transferee had reasonable cause to be-
lieve that a preference was intended. See Hume v. Brown, 33 Okla.
634, 126 Pac. 823. At the present time, however, in a suit by a
trustee to have the transaction set aside under section 6ob of the
Bankruptcy Act the trustee must show that the bankrupt was insolvent
when it was made and that it was made within four months of the
act of bankruptcy, that the mortgage operated as a preference and
that the mortgagee had reasonable cause to believe that a preference
would be effected at the time of making the transaction. Ogden v.
Reddish, (Ky.) 2oo Fed. 977 (1923); although in an action by the
trustee to set aside a bankrupt's conveyance to his wife made to de-
fraud creditors the husband and wife must bear the burden of show-
ing the integrity of the transaction. Harris v. Treadway, (Mass.)
2 F. (2d) 557 (1924). To constitute reasonable cause to believe that
a transaction would operate as a preference the test is whether, on
the information, a reasonably prudent person would have thought it
would effect a preference. McGee v. Brennan & Carson Company,
(Ga.) 2 F. (2d) 758 (1924). Lowell v. Chiasson, (Mass.) 300 Fed.
219 (1923). Mere ground for suspicion is not sufficient. Soper v.
International Harvester Company of America, 194 La. 868, i9o N. W.
386. Talty v. Rosenthal, (Mass.) 14 F. (2d) 630 (1926). In case of
mortgages and other instruments required to be recorded the four
month period allowed in the Bankruptcy Act does not begin to run
until the instrument is recorded, in which case, to create a prefer-
ence the mortgagee must have had reasonable cause to believe that a
preference would be effected when he had the mortgage recorded.
Bridgeman v. Covington, (N. C.) 219 Fed. 500 (1925). The test of
insolvency under section I (5) of the Bankruptcy Act is whether on
the date of the transfer the bankrupt's property was sufficient to pay
his debts. Hewitt v. Boston Straw Board Company, 44 Mass. 26o,
IOI N. E. 424. But in case of a partnership it must be shown not
only that the partnership' is insolvent at the time the transaction took
place but also that its members were insolvent. Tumlin v. Bryan,
(Ga.) 165 Fed. 166 (1913). In. the instant cas'e the trustee failed
to bear the buiden of proof in that he did not show that the bank-
rupt was insolvent at the time the transaction was made or that the
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transferee had reasonable cause to believe that a preference would be
effected and the result is that the transaction is valid, establishing a
good title in the mortgagee. FLOYD B. SPERRY.
CORPORATIONS- DIVERSION OF FUNDS - RECOVERY FOR CREDITORS.-
The president of a corporation, composed of the president himself
and the president's family, paid his personal debts with checks drawn
upon the corporation funds. Among the debts, so paid were the
premiums on an insurance policy covering his own life for the benefit
of his wife, also a stockholder of the corporation. The corporation
now in the hands of a receiver for the benefit of creditors, the re-
ceiver brings an action against the insurance company for the recov-
ery of the premiums so paid, or the cash surrender value of the policy
thereof. The payments were charged against the account of the
president on the books of the corporation and the payments ratified
by the stockholders. Held, a receiver of a corporation cannot re-
cover from insurance company premium on life policy of a stock-
holder paid with corporate funds while corporation was solvent, nor
cash surrender value thereof, where corporation ratified payment.
Sweet v. Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Co. et al, (Minn. 1926)
14 F. (2d) 763.
A right of action in favor of a torporation in behalf of its re-
ceiver can exist only where the corporation has a right of action
independent of the receivership. Metropolitan Coach Co. v. Freund,
42 App. D. C. 283. Receiver has only the rights that the corporation
itself had except in cases where the act has been ultra vires. Burch
v. West, 33 Ill., App. 359. Especially is this true in a case where the
stockholders are principally from one household and it is considered
by the courts as a family corporation, the custom being to pay the
family bills with checks drawn on the corporate funds and charged
to the account of the stockholder or employee, whose personal debts
are so paid. Little v. Garrabrant, (N. Y. 1895) 35 N. Y. S. 689. The
corporation, and therefore the receiver of an insolvent corporation
standing in the shoes of the corporation, could recover the overdraft
from the overdrawn employee of stockholder, but not from the
personal creditor of the stockholder or employee, as the creditor took
the corporate checks in good faith. Skinner v. Smith, (N. Y. 1892)
31 N. E. 91. HERSER L. EDWARDS.
FRAUD - SCIENTER - RECKLESS STATEMENTS. - In an action for
deceit to recover back the amount paid for the purchase of a gas
plant and other sums which had been lost in a fruitless attempt to
realize profit upon the manufacture of the same, the plaintiff alleges
that the defendant represented to him that a single complete plant
could be manufactured at a cost not exceeding $250.oo, and that the
complete outfit could be manufactured at any tin shop. Relying
upon these statements, the plaintiff bought the gas plant together with
the right to manufacture the same for the market. The plaintiff
proved that the cost of manufacturing the plant would be $700.00
instead of $250.0 and further that it could not be manufactured at
any tin shop, but would have to be made at certain manufacturing
centers where there was suitable machinery for that purpose. One
of the defenses set up was that the defendant did not know that it
was misrepresenting as to the cost of manufacture, but was merely
making statements of opinion. Held, one stating as true material
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facts susceptible of knowledge is liable for fraud though he did not
know that the representations were false at the time made. Jaquot v.
Farmers' Straw Gas Producer Co. et al (Wash.) 249 Pac. 984
(1926).
Originally, in actions on the case recovery was allowed by show-
ing a breach of warranty. Williamson v. Allison, 2 East 446. This
was distinctly a contract liability although the action was brought for
deceit. All that was necessary to be shown for recovery was that
there was a warranty and a breach thereof. Now, however, the
majority rule is that in order to recover in an action for deceit it is
necessary to allege and prove scienter on the part of the defendant.
Slater Trust Co. v. Gardner, 183 Fed. 268. The case of Ross v.
Mather, 51 N. Y. io8, points out the distinction between the older
cases and the cases which hold to the majority rule today. In this
case it was shown by the declaration that fraud was the basis of the
complaint and the plaintiff tried to recover for a breach of warranty.
The court held that the plaintiff could not recover for deceit because
he did not prove scienter, although he alleged it in his declaration.
Neither could the plaintiff recover on the contract without bringing
a new action. The decision states that if the representation relied
upon constitutes a warranty and if the property warranted does not
answer the description there can be a recovery upon the breach of
warranty irrespective of the question of scienter. If what is relied
upon is a false statement not amounting to a warranty, then aver-
ment and proof of the knowledge of its falsity by the party making
it are necessary. This is the law in North Dakota. Snee v. Schwartz,
25 N. D. 287, 141 N. W. 348. The courts make little distinction be-
tween cases of misrepresentation of facts actually known to be false
and cases involving assertions without any precise knowledge as to
whether the facts are true or false. Making statements which one
does not know to be true is considered just as unjustifiable as making
statements which one knows to be false. Bullitt v. Farrar, 42 Minn.
8, 43 N. W. 566 ;Chatham Furnace Co. v. Moffatt, 147 Mass. 4o3, 18
N. E. 168; Wakeman v. Daley, 51 N. Y. 27, IO Am. Rep. 551; 12
Eng. Ruling Case Law 296. Usually in these cases it is said that the
defendant is estopped from denying knowledge that the statements
made were false because it is his duty to find out whether they are
true or not before asserting them as facts. Fraud alone, without
scienter, is always sufficient grounds for the rescision of a contract.
In an action to rescind a contract upon the grounds of fraud it is not
necessary to allege and prove scienter, because this is a distinct
action from that of deceit. Here the courts hold that although the
statements made were made innocently and were later discovered to
be false that the plaintiff can recover his property back or his money
as the case may be .and thus rescind the sale. Mooney v. Davis, 75
Mich. 188, 42 N. W. 802; Alvarez v. Brannan, 7 Cal. 503, 68 Am.
Dec. 274. LYNN J. GEMMILL.
INJUNCTION - JURISDICTION OF EQUITY TO ENJOIN CRIMINAL
PROCEEDINGS. - Upon application by the plaintiff to the District Court
of the Fifth Judicial District, on the grounds that a new trial had been
improperly denied, an injunction was granted restraining the en-
forcement of final judgment imposed by the District Court of the
First Judicial District for a violation of the state banking laws in
the acceptance of deposits by the plaintiff's insolvent bank. Held,
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the action of the District Court and judge thereof was in excess of
jurisdiction; hence, could not be sustained. State ex rel Shafer v.
Lowe, (N. D.) 21o N. W. 501 (1926).
The court bases its decision upon the fact that only such actions
as the Legislative Assembly directs can be brought against the state,
NORTH DAKOTA CONSTITUTION, Sec. 22; and only actions respecting
title to property or arising upon contract are brought within the pro-
visions. REVIsED CODE, 1913, Sec. 8175. This decision is correct in
that the violation of the statute providing that an insolvent bank
must not accept deposits is made a felony punishable by fine or im-
prisonment, REvIsED CODE, 1913, Sec. 5175. The fact of the action
being brought against the officers of the state is equivalent to the
bringing of the action against the state itself, the state being the real
party in interest. 25 R. C. L. 413; Mullen v. Dwight, 42 S. D. 171,
173 N. W. 645; Longstreet v. Mecosta County, 228 Mich. 542, 200
N. W. 248. The decision may also be sustained upon the grounds
that a court of equity has no jurisdiction or power to enjoin crim-
inal proceeding, 14 R. C. L. 26; 32 C. J. 279; Story Eq. Jur.
(4th ed.) Sec. 1217; City of Bessemer v. Bessemer Waterworks,
152 Ala. 391, 44 So. 663. Authorities show that this rule rests in
part upon the basis of the decision of the instant case, that in crim-
inal actions the state is the plaintiff and cannot be sued. 2 BISHOP
CRIM. PROC. Sec. 1414; Kelly v. Conner, 122 Tenn. 339, 123 S. W.
622; Littleton v. Burgess, 14 Wyo. 173, 82 Pac. 864. The assertion
of innocence could not hinder the application of the rule. Colby v.
Binham, 116 N. Y. S. 705, 62 Misc. 396. Nor would the mere fact
of the statute being void allow equity to interfere with criminal pro-
ceedings relative to its violation. Christian Moerlien Brewing Co. v.
Hill, (Ga.) I66 Fed. 140. Evansville Brewing Assn. v. Excise Com-
mission of Jefferson County, Ala. (Ala.) 225 Fed. 204. But where
property would be placed in jeopardy or taken without due process
of law, an exception can be made. Snouffer and Ford v. City of
Tipton, 161 Iowa 223, 142 N. W. 97. Such exception seems to be
purely discretionary with the court. Cobb v. French, III Minn. 429,
127 N. W. 415. If in addition to an injury to property rights, there
will also be multiplicity of suits and irreparable injury, the prosecu-
tion will be enjoined. Zweigart v. Chesapeake and Ohio Ry., 161 Ky.
463, 170 S. W. 1194. In all cases, however, there must be an actual
trespass to property rights, and not merely consequential and inci-
dental injury. Milton Dairy Co. v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 124
Minn. 239, 144 N. W. 764. (Action to enjoin carriers from com-
plying with a Minnesota statute regulating shipments of cream on
the railways of the state on the ground of the unconstitutionality of
the act and that compliance would cause loss to shippers, was not
allowed). Fines and costs which may result from the prosecution
are not, therefore, such injuries to property as to allow restraining.
Board of Supervisors of Claiborne County v. Owen, ioo Miss. 462,
56 So. 525. Without injury to property rights, the prosecutions for
the violation of city ordinances could be no more enjoined than could
the violation of state statutes; Staines v. City of Atlanta, 139 Ga.
531, 77 S. E. 381; City of Chicago v. Chicago City Ry. Co., 22 Ill.,
560, 78 N. E. 89o. The court, having full exercise of jurisdiction
over the criminal case which was properly subject to its cognizance,
its action was not subject to review by a writ of habeas corpus.
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State v. Overby, (N. D.) 2o9 N..W. 552; Frank v. Mangum, 237
U. S. 309. Chief Justice Marshall applied this rule in Ex Parte
Watkins, 3 Pet. 193, 7 L. Ed. 65o. Later cases have consistently
followed the same rule. Toy Toy v. Hopkins, 212 U. S. 542, 29
Sup. Ct. 416; Harlan v. McGourin, 218 U. S. 442, 31 Sup. Ct. 44.
Thus when the plaintiff in the instant case later brought an action
to secure a review of the criminal proceedings against him by a writ
of habeas corpus, such writ was properly denied. State ex rel. Hagen
v. Overby, Sheriff, et al, (N. D.) 21o N. W. 652.
JALMER 0. Muus.
NEGLIGENCE - PROXIMATE CAUSE. - The plaintiff, an employee of
defendant railway company, was injured while standing on the sill
steps of cars of defendant's train when automobile collided with the
train. Plaintiff claims that due to the failure of defendant to comply
with the Safety Appliance Act defendant is liable for damages. Here
the employee in order to recover under the Act, must allege and prove
duty, failure to discharge duty, and injury proximately resulting
from such failure. Held, that the negligence of the defendant was
not the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury. Johnson v. Ry. Co.,
(N. D.) 2o9 N. W. 786 (1926).
Failure to comply with the Act is negligence per se. La Point v.
Hodgins Transfer Co., 48 N. D. 1032, 188 N. W. 166. Therefore
the sole question here is one of proximate cause. Forseeability is
sometimes a test of negligence. Blyth v. Birmingham Waterworks
Co., ii Exch. 781; Hammack v. White, ii C. B. (N. S.) 588. For-
seeability has been used for determining proximate cause. Arkansas
Valley Trust Co. v. McIlroy, (Ark.) 133 S. W. 816. The "but for"
rule has also, in some jurisdictions, been used to determine proxi-
mate cause, i. e., defendant is liable if the accident would not have
happened "but for" the negligence. It has been denied, however, in
others. Gilman v. Noyes, 57 N. H. 627. Both have been rejected by
other courts and "natural consequence" rule employed. Joslin v.
Linder, (S. D.) 128 N. W. 5oo. Although forseeability is some-
times used to determine negligence it is rejected in North Dakota as
a sole test for proximate cause and defendant has been held liable
even though the particular results of negligence were not anticipated.
Wilson v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co., 30 N. D. 456, 153 N. W. 429.
The "natural consequence" rule is adopted in this state. Garraghty
v. Hartstein, 26 N. D. 148, 143 N. W. 390. The "but for" rule
seems to be employed in the principal case, as an aid in determining
the importance of the intervening agency and Whether or not it was
a "controlling" agency. However negligent the defendant may have
been in failing to comply with the Safety Appliance Act, yet inter-
vening between that negligence and the accident and injury was a
responsible human agency, a controlling intervening cause for which
the defendant was in no wise responsible, and without which the
accident would not have happened. To determine natural conse-
quences the presence of an "intervening agency" is important. The
"but for" rule seems to' be employed to determine whether or not
the "intervening agency" is the proximate cause. See Orton v. Penn
R. R. Co., (C. C. A.) 6 Cir., 7 F. (2d) 36 (1925); see also Norris
J. Burke, Rules of Legal Cause in Negligence Cases, 15 CAL. L. REV.
1 (.1926). IRVING KOTIIS.
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TORT - DXGRE OF CARE REQUIRED OF GUEST IN AUTOMOBILE.
Plaintiff was riding in defendant's automobile as guest. Defendant
drove car at high rate of speed for a distance of one-fourth of mile,
car overturned and plaintiff was injured. Question: Is plaintiff
guilty of contributory negligence? Held, No. Plaintiff can recover.
Bryden v. Priem, (Wis.) 2o9 N. W. 703 (1926).
The problem which presents itself is, how far or to what extent
can a guest acquiesce in careless, reckless or negligent driving or
violation of the law and still not be held guilty of contributory negli-
gence in an action against the host. If a guest urges the chauffeur
to go at a high rate of speed or acquiesces in such demands on the
part of his comrades, and if the driver is thereby induced to go at
an unsafe rate of speed, and an accident occurs by reason thereof,
the guest's negligence will be held to have contributed to the result
and he cannot recover for injuries so received. Routledge v. Rambler
Auto Co., (Texas) 95 S. W. 749 (I9o6). On the same theory an in-
toxicated guest riding with an intoxicated driver, at a negligent rate
of speed was held to be negligent precluding recovery for his death
in an action against the driver. Schwartz v. Johnson, (Tenn.) 28o
S. W. 32 (1926). Even a sober invitee who rode without objection
with an intoxicated driver, at 40 miles per hour, on a public street,
when the machine was overloaded, was held to be negligent.
McGeever v. O'Bryne, 203 Ala. 266, 8o So. 5o8 (1919). Where
plaintiff, as defendant's guest, was riding in rear seat of car, which
defendant operated negligently at the rate of 5o miles per hour, the
plaintiff, unaccustomed to cars, became frightened but making no
protest, was held not guilty of contributory n.egligence. Jones v.
Schreiber, (Minn.) 207 N. W. 322 (1926). However a guest who
failed to remonstrate with the driver when he knew that they were ap-
proaching a railroad crossing at excessive speed was held to be barred
by his contributory negligence from recovery from the driver. Howe
v. Corey, 172 Wis. 537, 179 N. W. 791 (1920). Similarly where
the plaintiff was guest of defendant, who was the owner of a new
car which he negligently drove at an excessive speed, whereby plain-
tiff sustained injuries as result of accident, it was held that a
gratuitous guest in an automobile cannot sit idly by, observe clear
violations of speed laws, acquiesce in them, and then hold driver
liable for damages from collision. Harding v. Jesse, (Wis.) 207
N. W. 706 (1926). On the other hand where plaintiff was invited
by defendant to ride, and defendant entered a race with another car
which attempted to pass them, with the result that their machine col-
lided with a pile of brick and sand and plaintiff was injured, and it was
found that the guest had begged to be permitted to get out of the ma-
chine, there was no contributory negligence on guest's part and he
could recover damages from his host. Beard v. Klusmier, 158 Ky. 153,
164 S. W. 319 (1919). In an action by a gratuitous guest against the
negligent driver of an automobile for injuries sustained in collision
with a load of wood, it was held that the plaintiff could not recover
on account of his own negligence, when that. negligence consisted of a
failure to maintain a reasonable lookout, although he had protested
at the excessive rate of speed. Glick v.Baer, (Wis.) 201 N. W. 752
(1925). It was held that a guest riding in a rear seat at the time of
the accident which caused his death, was presumed to have been free
from contributory negligence. Day v. Isaacson, 124 Me. 407, 13o Atl.
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212 (1925). Also Where the guest fell asleep and the driver also fell
asleep, the guest was not guilty of contributory negligence. Bushnell
v. Bushnell, (Conn.) 131 Atl. 432 (1925). Where one was permit-
ted to ride on a truck for his accomodation, he was found to be negli-
gent in standing with his arm over the driver's cab, when he was
thrown out by a jolt of the truck, his position being one of unneces-
sary danger. Crider v. Yolander Coal Co., 2o6 Ala. 71, 89 So. 205
(1921). Where it was found that a guest acquiesced in the driver's
overloading of a seven passenger car until it carried twelve passen-
gers, so that it overturned and injured the guest, he was precluded
from recovery, by his own negligence. Webber v. Billings, 184 Mich.
II9, i5O N. W. 332 (1915). Two recent North Dakota cases deal-
ing with the question of whether the negligence of the driver is im-
puted to the guest, so as to bar the guest's recovery in an action for
damages against third parties, are found in Chambers v. Minneapolis,
St. Paul & Sault Ste. Marie Railroad Co., 37 N. D. 377, 163 N. W. 824
(917), and Amenia & Sharon Land Co. v. Minneapolis, St. Paul &
Sault Ste Marie Railroad Co., 48 N. D. 13o6, 189 N. W. 343 (1922).
CARL 0. LINDQUIST.
TRUSTS - RESULTING TRUSTS - LACHES. - (District of Columbia)
James Haliday, a widower, being 67 years of age and wishing to
provide for his old age and his children after his decease, bought of
Graham, a real estate broker in Washington, D. C., two lots for
$55oo, assuming the whole purchase price, part being paid at the time
and the rest to be paid in installments. This property was taken in
the name of his eight children; but he reserved in his deed the right
to the rents during his lifetime. Certain of the children now claim
both the legal and equitable title and are about to sell one of the lots.
Held, there is a resulting trust in favor of the father. Haliday v.
Haliday, ii Fed. 565 (1925).
Where one person pays purchase money for property and
conveyance of legal title is made to another, a resulting trust arises
in favor of the person furnishing purchase money: Niland et al v.
Kennedy, 316 Ill., 253, 147 N. E. 117 (1925); and a resulting trust
may be shown by parole evidence as it does not come within the
statute of frauds: McKinley County Abstract & Investment Co. v.
Shaw, 30 N. M. 517, 239 Pac. 865 (1925); and though a resulting
trust must arise at the time of the transfer and cannot be created by
subsequently assuming the obligation to pay the purchase price, the
trust will result where obligation to pay is assumed at the time of
the transfer and payments are made after the transfer: Kauffman v.
Kauffman et al, 266 Pa. 270, 120 Atl. 640 (1920). Acts of the
parties after the transfer cannot create a resulting trust; but evi-
dence of acts and conversations of parties after creating alleged re-
sulting trust in realty are admissible as evidence of intent of the
purchaser at time of making the purchase and transfer: Boston & N.
St. Ry. Co. v. Goodell et al, 233 Mass. 428, 124 N. E. 26o (I919).
However, where the transfer of the legal title is made to one who is
the natural object of his bounty, a presumption arises that it was in-
tended as an advancement, although this presumption may be rebut-
ted by parole: McCafferty v. Flinn, (Del.) 125 Atl. 675 (1924).
However, in North Dakota where the statutes are declaratory of the
rule of equity with respect to resulting trusts there are no exceptions
made in favor of advancements and gifts: C. L. N. D. (1913) sec.
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5365. Thus where a husband bought and paid for certain property
and had the title taken in the name of his wife, a presumption arose
that there was a resulting trust :Roberge v. Roberge, 46 N. D. 402,
18o N. W. 15 (1920); see BOGERT ON TRUSTS, p. III. Time, lapse
of which constitutes laches barring establishment of a resulting trust,
begins to run when cestui learns of the trustee's disavowal: Vigne v.
Vigne, (N. J.) 13o Atl. 816 (1925). Thus in Haliday v. Haliday the
disavowal of trust several years before this action was brought did
not start the statute of limitations running till it came to the know-
ledge of the cestui que trust. T. F. MURTHA, JR.
TRUSTS - RESULTING TRUSTS - LAND PURCHASED BY HUSBAND IN
NAME OF WIFE.- A husband, after the death of his wife, sues to
establish in his favor a resulting trust in land that he had purchased,
taking title in the name of his wife. The evidence showed beyond a
reasonable doubt that the husband did not intend a gift or advance-
ment to the wife, but that it should be his property. Held, A result-
ing trust is created in favor of the husband, and the busband was
not guilty of laches in failing to bring suit before the death of the
wife to establish the trust. John v. John, (Ill.) 153 N. E. 363 (1926).
The rule is well settled that where the purchase price of real
property is paid by one person, and the title thereto is taken in the
name of another, that a resulting trust arises at once in favor of the
person paying the purchase money, and the holder of the legal title
becomes a trustee for him. Doll v. Doll, 96 Neb. 185, 147 N. W.
471. The resulting trust arises in such case regardless of any con-
tract or agreement between the parties. Metropolitan Trust & Sav-
ings Bank v. Perry, 225 Ill. 183, 102 N. E. 218. Sifice the resulting
trust does not depend on any contract or agreement between the
parties, it naturally follows that it is immaterial who made that con-
tract. In other words, it is immaterial whether the purchase was made
and the money paid by the trustee or the cestui que trust. The im-
portant consideration to be borne in mind is who paid the considera-
tion, and what was his intention. Cunningham v. Cunningham, 125
Iowa 681, IOI N. W. 470. Generally, as above stated, where the pur-
chase money of land is paid by one person, and the title is taken in
the name of another, the party taking the title is presumed to hold
it in trust for him who pays the purchase price. The reason given
for this rule is that the party who pays the money is presumed to
intend to become the owner of the property, and the beneficial title
follows such intention. Bailey v. Dobbins, 67 Neb. 548, 93 N. W.
687. However, where a person making a purchase of land in the
name of another, and paying the purchase price himself is under a
natural or moral obligation to provide for the person in whose name
the conveyance is taken, such as in the case of parent and child, or
husband and wife, no presumption of a resulting trust will arise, but
it will be presumed as a gift or advancement for the benefit of the
nominal purchaser. Spradling v. Spradling, Ioi Ark. 451, 142 S.W.
848. Such a presumption can be rebutted by showing a contrary in-
tention on the part of the person who paid the consideration, and that
he in fact intended to be the owner of the property so purchased, and
that the property was not to be held by the dependent person as a gift
or advancement. Roberge v. Roberge, 46'N. D. 402, i8o N. W. 15.
Since the Statute of Frauds does not apply in the case of resulting
trusts, because it is a trust raised by implication of law, Havner Land
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Co. v. MacGregor, 169 Iowa 5, 149 N. W. 617, it is clear that the parole
agreement of the parties can be shown, as in the principal case, to
prove the necessary intent to rebut the presumption of a gift, advance-
ment, or settlement which is raised by law. Appeal of Wilson, 84
Conn. 56o, 8o Atl. 718. The parol agreement, however, which is
thus shown and relied upon to rebut the presumption of law, must not
raise a trust which in character is different from that which the law
implies from the facts of the case. Brettenbucher v. Oppenheim, i6o
Cal. 98, 116 Pac. 55. A beneficiary of a resulting trust may be
barred from enforcing his claim by laches. Moore v. Taylor, 251 Ill.
468, 96 N. E. 229. The defense of laches is independent of the
statute of limitations, but yet it has been held that if the statutory
period has expired, there is a strong presumption of laches. Taylor
v. Coggins, 244 Pa. 228, 90 At. 633. The term "laches," in the broad
legal sense, as interpreted by courts of equity, signifies such unrea-
sonable delay in the assertion of and attempted securing of equitable
rights as should constitute in equity and good conscience a bar to re-
covery. Gaff v. Portland Town & Mineral Co., 12 Colo. App. lo6,
54 Pac. 854. Since the courts are reluctant to apply the doctrine of
laches to the rights of a cestui que trust, Jenkins v. Hammerschlag,
38 App. Div. 209, 56 N. Y. Supp. 534, no doubt the courts will require
strong evidence of the operation of an inequity by enforcing the re-
sulting trust before the doctrine will be held to bar the claim of the
cestui. Since the facts of each particular case must necessarily govern
the application of the doctrine, then if the relationship of husband and
wife exists between the parties, the intimate relations between the
husband and wife, and the reasons for the trust must be considered in
determining the defense of laches to an action to establish a resulting
trust to property taken in the name of one spouse, when the other
pays the consideration. Wright v. Wright, 242 Ill. 71, 89 NE. 789,
Hence, as in the principal case, the husband purchasing in the. name
of the wife, in whom he placed utmost confidence, and who expressed
the intention of turning over the title to the husband, is not required
to institute suit to protect his interest in the property during the wife's
lifetime in order to prevent himself from being guilty of laches.
Wright v. 'Wright, supra; Davis v. Downer, 21o Mass. 573, 97 NE. 90
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THE CONSTITUTION AND I.
During recent years there has been considerable effort put forth
to limit the power of our courts to declare laws unconstitutional, one
of the proposals being to give Congress the power to make effective
any law that had been declared unconstitutional by mere re-passage
after such a decision.
It should be recalled that, in order to obtain approval of the doc-
ument by a sufficient number of states, certain additions were agreed
to in the original draft.
The purpose of these additions, or amendments, was to prevent
the possible loss of some of the "blessings of liberty" gained through
the sacrifices of war.
And so Congress was denied the right to pass a law: i. Restrict-
ing the exercise of religious preferences; 2. Abridging the freedom of
speech or assembly; 3. Quartering soldiers in time of peace without
consent; 4. Allowing search or seizure of persons, houses, papers or
